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COUNTRY Poland**DATE DISTR.** 7 April 1954**SUBJECT** Reactions to Test Explosions of
the Hydrogen Bomb**NO. OF PAGES** 3**DATE OF INFORMATION****REFERENCES:**

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PLACE ACQUIRED**THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION**

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Based on the information in the American press

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the test explosion of the hydrogen bomb on 1 March 1954 as a very successful experiment which surpassed in its explosive power the expectations of the specialists. Judging from the direct effects and further consequences of the radioactive ashes, this new weapon is unbelievably horrible and will bring, in the case of war, unheard of destruction to enemy territory. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed, since the USSR is also in possession of the hydrogen bomb, that this weapon will prevent Soviet Russia from aggression or that it may be used as a means for gaining concessions. A weapon will give political superiority in peace time only as long as the enemy does not also possess it. Up until about 1949 when the United States possessed colossal superiority because of her possession of the atomic bomb, there was a possibility of forcing Russia to make concessions since the method of construction of the bomb was not then known to the USSR.

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The second explosion of the hydrogen bomb on 1 March 1954 which surpassed even the most daring expectations of its US constructors, should, no doubt, be regarded as a colossal achievement on the part of the United States. One should assume that even further developments in this field can be expected in

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the near future. It is evident that this test was a strong warning to the USSR, and that in case of further irreconcilable differences the USSR will be held responsible for starting a war in which such terrible means of destruction will be used. The fact that news of the explosion was released after the unsuccessful Berlin Conference and shortly before the April Conference in Geneva is highly significant. The fact that the USSR is also in possession of this weapon is of great importance. Meager information in general, and especially the complete lack of information concerning Russian results of hydrogen bomb explosions, permit no objective comparison of the achievements of the two countries in this field. It should be assumed, because of the well-known inferiority of the USSR in the technical field, that production with respect to development, quantity, and quality is certainly considerably inferior to that of the United States. [redacted] this event will n25X1 change the attitude of the USSR toward the west in any respect. This assertion is based on the knowledge of Communist doctrine which is presented very clearly and without compromise in all classical works of MARX. The present leaders of the Kremlin are only executors of this doctrine which regards everything that does not further Communism as hostile. This statement is confirmed by past events. The most suitable period in which the USSR could have been forced to unconditional surrender was prior to 1950, before the USSR carried out the first explosion of the atomic bomb.

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[redacted] little was known about atomic and hydrogen bombs and what was known was learned from Western broadcasts. The Communist regime only gave the explanation that the United States used this weapon as a kind of "scarecrow" for propaganda purposes. 1. The reaction to the news of the latest hydrogen bomb explosion was probably the same among all groups of the population. No doubt this experiment made a big impression when it was learned what immense destruction could be caused by this unique and horrible weapon. Nevertheless, because they knew that the USSR also possessed the hydrogen bomb, this latest experiment could not have appeared convincing with respect to overwhelming US superiority in this field. The Poles, from 1945 to about 1950, waited patiently for the West to fight out the controversies with the USSR. [redacted] in 25X1 1947, Prime Minister CHURCHILL made a statement that the West had superiority because it possessed the atomic bomb, but that possession by the USSR within four or five years was foreseen and that then the settling of controversies obviously would be much more difficult. The Poles, after that statement, waited patiently for decisive action by the United States. Unfortunately, they lived to see that CHURCHILL's forecast was correct. Until it was confirmed by the West many Poles did not want to believe the USSR statement that she also possessed the atomic bomb. Later the Poles heard that the United States possessed the hydrogen bomb and this, to some extent, raised morale and their trust in the unsurpassed superiority of the United States. At that time there was a popular slogan repeated among the Poles who came from Lwow, a town incorporated into the USSR after 1945. "One hydrogen bomb more, and we will return at once to Lwow" ("Jeszcze jedna bomba wodorowa i jedziemy juz do Lwowa"). Unfortunately, this period of exclusive possession of the hydrogen bomb brought no further developments in the attitude of the United States toward the USSR. The result of this delay was the development of the hydrogen bomb by the USSR and the announcement of its first explosion in Russia in September 1953. News of this lowered morale in Poland for it was understood that the two countries were equally advanced in this field. Later, when President Eisenhower suggested peaceful discussions on the international control of the atomic bomb, [redacted] 25X1 in Poland, it was regarded as some kind of concession and 25X1

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sign of weakness on the part of the West, especially since this suggestion was made after the USSR had announced her possession of the hydrogen bomb. In short, the latest explosion of the hydrogen bomb made no particular impression on the Poles. the Poles do not expect the atomic or hydrogen bomb to be dropped in Poland but believe it will be used against strategic and economic centers of the USSR.

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The hydrogen bomb explosion by the USSR in 1953, confirmed by the US, fortified Polish conviction that developments in this field were almost on a par, with the exception of superior US technical production. One can assume that this is the prevailing opinion of all groups in Poland. Before the announcement of the explosion of the hydrogen bomb by the USSR, Communist propaganda questioned the possibility of construction of the hydrogen bomb in general and especially by the US for a long time. This was especially stressed at various PZPR meetings. The first explosion of the hydrogen bomb by the US was called a propaganda trick. For this reason, the first explosion by the Soviets was, no doubt, exploited to the fullest in order to erase from the memory of the people former Russian inferiority in this field. Taking into consideration the general aims of the Communists, based on uncompromising Communist doctrine, in addition to the fact that the USSR is in possession of the hydrogen bomb, the Poles will not link the latest US success with the hope of regaining their freedom. The recently published statements of the effect of the bomb permit one to visualize how horrible the future and, unfortunately, unavoidable war will be. In this connection the political events which have aroused the greatest interest in Poland are as follows:

- a. CHURCHILL's speech (1946-47) which stated that the military superiority of the West derived from Western possession of the atomic bomb. Unfortunately, this is no longer true.
- b. The statement of President EISENHOWER (April 1953) which contained strong suggestions for peace was linked by the Poles with the possibility of an ultimatum to the USSR. This hope, unfortunately, vanished very quickly. The explosion of the Soviet hydrogen bomb certainly deprived the Poles of all remaining optimistic hopes. This news was certainly used by the Communist propagandists in Poland for a long time. The dejection of the Poles deepened when results of the Berlin Conference were known.

In light of these two statements, followed with special interest by all Poles, one can deduct that those excellent achievements of the recent hydrogen bomb explosion were regarded only as an interesting technical experiment. The bomb is probably regarded as the main weapon to be used in future wars, but the Poles will consider that no change in international policy which would bring liberation to Poland will result from this event. Only a small minority of Poles, mostly of the intelligentsia (called "incorrigible optimists" by the majority), will try to rationalize this into a favorable event. One can assume that a part of the intelligentsia will wait to form a final opinion until after the Geneva Conference.

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